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Abstract
Despite achieving state-of-the-art performance across many
domains, machine learning systems are highly vulnerable to
subtle adversarial perturbations. Although defense approaches
have been proposed in recent years, many have been bypassed
by even weak adversarial attacks. An early study [22] shows
that ensembles created by combining multiple weak defenses
(i.e., input data transformations) are still weak. We show
that it is indeed possible to construct effective ensembles
using weak defenses to block adversarial attacks. However,
to do so requires a diverse set of such weak defenses. In
this work, we propose ATHENA, an extensible framework
for building effective defenses to adversarial attacks against
machine learning systems. Here we conducted a compre-
hensive empirical study to evaluate several realizations of
ATHENA. More specifically, we evaluated the effectiveness of
5 ensemble strategies with a diverse set of many weak defenses
that comprise transforming the inputs (e.g., rotation, shifting,
noising, denoising, and many more) before feeding them to
target deep neural network (DNN) classifiers. We evaluate
the effectiveness of the ensembles with adversarial examples
generated by 9 various adversaries (i.e., FGSM, CW, etc.) in
4 threat models (i.e., zero-knowledge, black-box, gray-box,
white-box) on MNIST. We also explain, via a comprehensive
empirical study, why building defenses based on the idea of
many diverse weak defenses works, when it is most effective,
and what its inherent limitations and overhead are.
I. INTRODUCTION
Though they achieve state-of-the-art performance across
many domains such as speech recognition [45], object de-
tection [21], and image classification [21], machine learning
systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. Such
adversarial examples, also known as wild patterns [4], can
typically be crafted by adding small, human-imperceptible
perturbations to legitimate examples [5], [17], [26], [41].
Various adversarial attacks have been recently proposed to
compromise machine learning systems by leveraging such
vulnerabilities [5], [11], [17], [26], [29], [32], [35]. Vulner-
ability of machine learning models to adversaries can lead to
extremely serious security consequences. For example, self-
driving vehicles may be tricked to recognize stop signs as
speed limit signs [13] or a medical diagnostic device may
be fooled to identify a benign tissue as malignant [16]; both
scenarios may result in serious consequences [23].
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Fig. 1: Test accuracy of ensembles increase as the number of weak defenses increase
and the patterns vary depending on the strength of the adversary.
In this work, we focus on evasion attacks [3], where an
adversary perturbs input data at test time with the aim to
mislead the machine learning classifier. A previous work has
shown that ensembles of weak defenses (WD) are still weak
in this type of scenario [22]. The common characteristic
among all of the ensemble methods considered in [22] is the
adoption of a very limited number of weak defenses (i.e.,
less than 3). In this work, we show that it is possible to
indeed construct effective ensembles as a defense mechanism
for machine learning systems if we use many diverse weak
defenses as opposed to only a few ones. In our extensive
experiments under different types of attacks, we observed that
the effectiveness of an ensemble may depend on the number
and diversity of WDs. We built a prototype of an ensemble
with many WDs, where each WD is a DNN classifier that first
applies an associated transformation1 on the original input and
then predict an output for the transformed input. We built the
ATHENA prototype using an ideal ensemble strategy, wherein
as long as one or more WDs output the correct label, the
ensemble is able to correctly classify the input.2 We trained
a pool of candidate WDs associated with a large variety of
transformations, evaluated each WD on all sets of adversarial
examples, and then varied the number of WDs involved for
the purpose of identifying and evaluating the ideal model.
To demonstrate the idea behind ATHENA, we use Figure 1
1We therefore use weak defense and transformation interchangeably
2Note that this is only for demonstration
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to present the changes in test accuracy of the ideal model
with k (k = 1, 2, 3, ...) weak defenses on 6 sets of adversarial
examples generated by DEEPFOOL and FGSM (3 variants per
attack with weak, median, and strong attacking capabilities).
In the figure, we plot the results of the random selection of
WDs (green dotted line) as well as best weak defenses first
(pink solid line) and worst weak defenses first (blue dashed
line). From Figure 1, we observe:
• For adversarial examples crafted by a certain adversary, the
more effective the WDs, the fewer WDs are required for the
ideal model to achieve a certain level of test accuracy.
• For adversarial examples generated by the same attack
method (e.g., DEEPFOOL, FGSM, etc.), the stronger the
adversarial example is, the more WDs are required to
build an effective ideal model. For example, in order to
build an ideal model to achieve a test accuracy above
95%, only two WDs are required for samples generated
by DEEPFOOL(os:3) (Figure 1(a)). As the capability of the
adversary increases, more WDs are required, for example,
5 and 57 WDs for DEEPFOOL(os:8) (Figure 1(b)) and
DEEPFOOL(os:20) (Figure 1(c)), respectively.
• Besides the quality (in terms of effectiveness against adver-
sary) of WDs, the effectiveness of the ideal model relies
on the quantity and diversity of WDs. The ideal ensemble
becomes more effective as the number of WDs (k) used to
build the ideal ensemble model increases, no matter how
we pick and add the new weak defense to the ensemble.
That is, test accuracy of an ensemble increases as it is built
with a greater number of WDs. For example, evaluated
with examples crafted by DEEPFOOL(os:20), the average
test accuracy increases from 56.99% to 95.26%.
• Such observations hold in all 9 adversaries (see Figure 13).
The observations suggest that it is possible to construct
an ensemble with many diverse WDs such that, by utilizing
the outputs from WDs, the model becomes robust against
many forms of attacks. In this work, we aim to construct
efficient defenses without presuming anything regarding the
unknown inputs (i.e., the adversary used to craft the adversarial
examples). That is, we are focusing on building defenses
that, in general, are robust to any adversary. We, therefore,
propose ATHENA3, a flexible and extensible framework for
building such effective and generic defenses to adversarial
attacks against machine learning systems.
To realize ATHENA, there are many potential transforma-
tions and it is impossible to involve the entire spectrum into
the ensemble model. Instead, we examine various types of
representative image transformations (e.g., rotation, shifting,
noising, denoising, and many more) and implement several
variants for each type of transformation; for example, we
choose several rotations (90 and 180 degrees), several shifts in
different directions (up, left, down, right), and so on. In total,
we consider 72 transformations (complete list is in Table III).
Overall, we make the following contributions:
3Goddess of defense in Greek mythology
• We studied the defensive effectiveness of 72 transforma-
tions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
studying such a large variety of transformations.
• We propose a framework, called ATHENA, for building
ensemble defenses that is flexible to scale by simply adding
more WDs into or removing WDs from the ensemble.
ATHENA is also very easy to update by replacing any weak
defenses or the ensemble strategy being used to produce
the final label from the outputs of WDs. We proposed,
implemented, and evaluated 5 ensemble strategies (e.g.,
majority voting among WDs), showing the possibility to
construct effective defenses.
• We evaluated ATHENA via 4 threat models (with different
assumptions about what adversary knows about the defense)
for image classification with Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN) on MNIST:
– Zero-knowledge: We evaluated on 27 sets of adversarial
examples crafted by 9 attack methods. Our proposed
defense improves the effectiveness by 1.16x (83.34% to
97.09%) to 28.73x (3.43% to 98.56%) (Section IV-D).
– Black-box: We evaluated on 180 sets of adversarial exam-
ples (for each of the 5 ensembles with 4 various budgets
and 9 attack methods). We have shown that the proposed
defense can block the transfer of adversarial examples
from the trained substitute model to the target classifier,
where the accuracy of the target defended model signifi-
cantly improves over the fooled model from 1.29x (69%
to 89.12%) to 52.32x (1.9% to 99.4%) (Section IV-E).
– Gray-box and White-box: We generated 5 sets of adver-
sarial examples with various constraints for each model.
The effectiveness of our approach drops with adversarial
examples that were generated based on gray-box/white-
box threat model (test accuracy drops to 16% for the
gray-box threat model and 6% for the white-box threat
model). However, we show that it is computationally
costly (356x for gray-box threat model and 290x for
white-box threat model) and easily detectable by a simple
adversarial detector (87.76% examples for gray-box and
89.8% examples for white-box threat model are success-
fully detected) (Section IV-F).
• We performed a comprehensive empirical study to under-
stand why the ensemble of many WDs works, when it is
most effective, as well as what its overhead is.
• We also released the source code and experimental data
with the hope that others can build upon this extensible
framework via https://github.com/softsys4ai/athena.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we layout notations and concepts for the
remainder of the paper.
A. Notations
In this paper, we refer to the original data set as D ⊂ Rd;
a transformation operation as Ti (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ); and Ti(x)
as the output of applying transformation Ti on the input x.
The composition of n transformations is also a transformation:
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Tg = Tn ◦ Tn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ T1. Therefore, we use Ti to denote a
transformation or a composition of transformations. Dti =
{xti = Ti(x)|x ∈ D} is used to denote the set of transformed
examples of D associated to Ti. That is, Dti = Ti(D).
We focus our work on supervised machine learning, where
a classifier is trained on labeled data in D. Here, a classifier
is a function f(·) that takes as input a data point x ∈ Rd and
produces a vector y of probabilities associated to all classes in
C. Given a target model f(·) and an input x with ground truth
ytrue, an adversary attempt to produce an adversarial example
(AE) x′, such that argmax(f(x′)) 6= ytrue, where:
x′ = argmaxδ(L(f,x, ytrue)),
whereby ||δ||p ≤  and x + δ ∈ [0, 1]D,
(1)
where argmax(f(x)) is the predicted output given an input
x, L is the loss function, δ is the perturbation, and  is
the magnitude of the perturbation. To remain undetected, the
adversarial example x′ should be as similar to the benign
example as possible; therefore, attack methods (e.g., FGSM,
PGD, and CW) use different norms (such as l0, l2, or l∞) to
constrain the distance between x and x′.
When crafting an adversarial example for an input, some
attackers force the target model to produce a specific output
label, t ∈ C, for a given input, while other attackers only seek
to produce an output label that does not equal the ground
truth. The former is referred to as a targeted, while the latter
is referred to as an untargeted attack or non-targeted attack.
Given a set of N input data {x1, . . . ,xN} and a tar-
get classifier f(·), an adversarial attack aims to generate
{x′1, . . . ,x′N}, such that each x′n is an adversarial example
for xn. The success rate of an attack is measured by the
proportion of predictions that were altered by an attack:
1
N
∑N
n=1 1[f(xn) 6= f(x′n)]. The success rate is generally
measured as a function of the magnitude of the perturbations
performed by the attack, using the normalized l2-dissimilarity:
1
N
N∑
n=1
‖xn − x′n‖2
‖xn‖2 . (2)
A strong adversarial attack has a high success rate while its
normalized l2-dissimilarity is low.
A defense is a method that aims to make the prediction
on an adversarial example equal to the prediction on the
corresponding clean example, i.e., argmax(f(x′)) = ytrue. In
this work, our defense mechanism is based on the idea of many
diverse weak defenses, which are essentially transformation-
based defenses, i.e., they produce output label via f(Ti(x′)).
Typically, T (·) is a complex, non-differentiable, and poten-
tially stochastic function, which makes it difficult for an
adversary to attack the machine learning model f(T (x)), even
when the adversary knows both f(·) and T (·).
The model fti that was trained using data set Dti(i =
1, 2, . . . ) is referred to as a weak defense (WD), and each
model will be used collectively to construct defense ensem-
bles. On the other side, the original model f that is trained on
D is referred to as the undefended model (UM).
B. Adversarial Attack
Many adversarial attack methods have been proposed to
generate “strong” adversarial examples [4].
Gradient-based Attacks perturb their input with the gradi-
ent of the loss with respect to the input. Some attacks in this
family perturb the input only in one iteration. For example,
FGSM [17] processes an adversarial example as following:
x′ = x +  · sign(5xJ(x,y)), (3)
where J is the cost function of target model f , 5x is the
gradient with respect to the input x with corresponding true
output y, and  is the magnitude of the perturbation.
Other variations, like BIM [27], PGD [29], and MIM [11],
are iterative and gradually increase the magnitude until the
input is misclassified. For example, BIM, an extension of
FGSM, rather than taking one big jump , takes multiple
smaller steps α <  with the result clipped by . Specifically,
BIM begins with x′0 = x, and at each iteration it performs:
x′i = clipx,{x′i−1 − (α · sign(5xJ(x′i−1,y))}, (4)
where clipx,(A) denotes the element-wise clipping of x; the
range of Ai−1 after clipping will be [x− ,x + ].
JSMA [35], another gradient-based approach, greedily finds
the most sensitive direction, such that changing its values will
significantly increase the likelihood of a target model labeling
the input as the target class:
st =
δt
δxi
; so = Σj 6=t
δj
δxi
;
s(xi) = st|so| · (st < 0) · (so > 0),
(5)
where st represents the Jacobian of target class t ∈ C with
respect to the input image, and where so is the sum of Jacobian
values of all non-target classes.
Optimization-based Attacks generate adversarial examples
by solving an optimization problem like:
argmin(d(s, x+ δ) + c · L(x+ δ)), (6)
where L is the loss function for solving f(x + δ) = t and
t ∈ C is the target label. CW [5] constraint adversarial samples
to stay within a certain distance from the benign example.
DEEPFOOL [32] takes iterative steps to the direction of the
gradient provided by a locally linear approximation of the
target model.
Black-box Attacks do not require any knowledge of target
models, yet are shown to be effective in fooling machine learn-
ing models. ONE-PIXEL [40], one of the extreme adversarial
attack methods, generates adversarial examples using an evolu-
tionary algorithm called Differential Evolution [39], which fits
well with gradient-free optimization. ONE-PIXEL represents
individuals as a vector of real numbers, new individuals are
generated as follows:
xc = xp1 + mutation · (xp2 − xp3), (7)
where xc is a child and xpi(i = 1, 2, 3) are parents in the
evolutionary algorithm.
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Fig. 2: ATHENA: A framework of Many Weak Defenses.
III. ATHENA: A FRAMEWORK OF MANY WEAK DEFENSES
In this section, we present our defense framework, called
ATHENA, based on which we can construct effective de-
fenses that are resilient to adversarial attacks, even with full
knowledge of the defense in place. Further, such defenses
are not tied to a particular machine learning (ML) classifier
and can be deployed in different domains outside of image
classification. The defense is based on ensemble of many
diverse weak defenses. To be upfront, we will evaluate a
particular realization of ATHENA based on 72 WDs and 5
ensemble strategies for image classification with CNN models.
A. Approach Overview
ATHENA works as follow: At test time, for the given input
data x, (i) it first collects outputs from all WDs, and then
(ii) it uses an ensemble strategy (e.g., majority voting) to
compute the final output (Figure 2(b)). Each WD (orange
dashed rectangles in Figure 2) can be any ML model (such as a
CNN or Logistic Regression) trained separately (Figure 2(a)).
Our proposed defense framework is:
• Extensible: One can add new WDs and, therefore, improve
its effectiveness or can remove WDs, which will sacrifice the
effectiveness but will also decrease the runtime overhead.
• Flexible: One can update the ensemble, making it robust by
replacing any (i) WDs and/or (ii) ensemble strategy.
In the section, we will describe the ingredients of our
framework, including the essence of WDs (Section III-B) as
well as the ensemble strategies (Section III-C).
B. Transformation as a Weak Defense
Transformations have shown to be effective in deterring
some adversarial perturbations [2], [20], [38]. To provide a
more comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of
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Fig. 3: Sample adversarial images generated by various adversaries and their correspond-
ing distortions created by transformations represented in each row. (i) In the 1st row, we
present inputs—an original input followed by the adversarial examples with predicted
label and confidence produced by the UM f(·). (ii) In the 2nd row, we present the
perturbation generated by the adversary corresponding to the column. (iii) In each cell in
rows 3–9, we present the distortion generated by applying the transformation represented
in a current row to the input in the colu n with the predicted label and confidence
produced by the weak defense associated to the corresponding transformation.
transformations, we examined a large variety of transforma-
tions (see Table III) against AEs generated by various attacks.
Figure 3 presents sample inputs from MNIST in the 1st row—
a legitimate input followed by AEs generated by the delineated
adversaries that correspond to each column, the corresponding
adversarial perturbations (i.e., ‖x − x′‖) are shown in the
2nd row, and the distortions (i.e., ‖x− Ti(x′)‖) generated by
some sample transformations are shown in the 3rd–9th rows.
Under each sample, the predicted label and the corresponding
probability produced by the WD when fed with the input in
the 1st row are plotted. For example, the sample in grid (5,
5) was generated by applying filter(max) on the AE that had
been generated by DEEPFOOL l2 and the corresponding WD
labeled it as the digit 7 with a confidence of 0.28. Overall, the
following observations have been made:
• For an AE, there is at least one WD that can correctly
label it. For example, the AE generated by DEEPFOOL is
correctly classified by all WDs except geometric(iradon).
• Each WD is able to correctly classify some of the AEs
generated by an adversary. For example, WD associated to
morphology(dilation) can correctly classify samples gener-
ated by FGSM, BIM l∞, CW l2, JSMA, MIM, and PGD.
• Different transformations are effective against different type
of adversaries. For example, the sample generated by
FGSM is misclassified by WD associated to rotate(180◦);
however, it is correctly classified by morphology(dilation).
These observations alongside the earlier observations sum-
marized in Figure 1 indicate that ensembles on top of many
diverse transformations could form effective defenses.
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C. Ensemble of Many Diverse Weak Defenses
As observed in Figure 3, the effectiveness of a certain
transformation varies according to the adversary being used to
craft the AEs. It is difficult to find a small set of transformation
operations (i.e., 2–3) that are effective against all adversaries.
Nevertheless, the observations from Figures 1 and 13 suggest
that the weakness of individual WDs can be addressed by in-
creasing the quantity of sample WDs included in the ensemble.
As presented in Figure 2(a), we train a WD fti by first
applying a transformation, Ti, on the original data D, and
then training a CNN classifier using the transformed data set
Dti . At the testing phase (Figure 2(b)), given an input x (it
can be a legitimate input or an adversarial input), we first
apply a transformation Ti on the input x and then feed the
transformed input xti to corresponding WD fti . After we col-
lected predictions from all WDs, we use an ensemble strategy
(e.g., majority voting) to compute the final predicted label y by
utilizing the predictions (probabilities and/or logits) of WDs.
We will elaborate on 5 ensemble strategies in Section IV-B.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Here, we describe the experimental setup and discuss the
results pertaining to the effectiveness of ATHENA.
A. Experimental Setup
TABLE I: Architecture and training parameters of weak defenses and undefended model.
Architecture Parameters
Conv.ReLU 3× 3× 32 Optimization Method Adam
Max Pooling 2× 2 Learning Rate 0.001
Conv.ReLU 3× 3× 64 Batch Size 128
Max Pooling 2× 2 Epochs 50
Dense 4096
Dropout 0.4
Dense 10
Softmax 10
1) Dataset: We evaluated our work thoroughly on MNIST, a
set of handwritten digits, containing 60k 28×28 gray-scale
images in the training and 10k in the testing set. We used
this benchmark due to its extensive use by adversarial ML
work, whereby a comprehensive evaluation was feasible
with this benchmark.
2) Attack methods: To evaluate our approach, we crafted
3 sets of AEs with different densities of perturbations
(weak, medium, strong) for each of the 9 attack methods
(created 27 AE sets in total): FGSM, BIM(l2-norm and
l∞-norm versions), JSMA, PGD, DEEPFOOL(l2-norm),
CW(l2-norm), ONE-PIXEL, and MIM. We implemented
attack methods on top of CleverHans [33].
3) We trained a list of WDs, each associated to one trans-
formation (Table III). When training a classifier, we used
80% of training data as our training examples and 20%
as the validation examples. In this work, we evaluated our
approach only on CNNs (LeNet architecture). The details
about the architecture and the training parameters are in
Table I. We used TensorFlow for training and inference.
4) We used 5 ensemble strategies (Section IV-B).
5) We evaluated the effectiveness of our defense in four forms
of threat models from the weakest to the strongest: zero-
knowledge (Section IV-D), black-box (Section IV-E), gray-
box (Section IV-F), and white-box (Section IV-F).
6) We conducted the experiments (e.g., training WDs, crafting
AEs) on multiple machines (Table IV).
B. Ensemble Strategies
We implemented 5 simple WD ensemble strategies:
1) Random Defense (RD) strategy will randomly choose a
WD to predict the input. The expected effectiveness of this
ensemble is the average of all WDs. Where most of the
WDs chosen are robust, the resulting ensemble using RD
strategy is also expected to be robust. This strategy has an
additional benefit of stochastic behavior in which neither
the attacker nor the defender know what WD will be used
at a certain time; so, the attacker has to fool all WDs.
2) Majority Voting (MV) strategy will collect the predicted
labels of all WDs, and then it determines the label that is
agreed upon by most WDs. The more evenly the predicted
labels are distributed, the fewer WDs are required for the
ensemble to correctly classify the input. MV requires only⌊ |{fti}|
2
⌋
+ 1 WDs to correctly predict the correct label.
3) Top 2 Majority Voting (T2MV) strategy works similar
to the MV except that T2MV collects labels associated to
the top two probabilities and, thereafter, performs majority
voting among them. As we observed from Figure 3, the
predicted probability distributions of some WDs on certain
AEs are soft, such that those WDs are less confident with
their predictions, whereby the correct answer may lie in
the classes for which they are less confident.
4) Average Probability (AVEP) strategy produces the final
predictions based on the average predicted probabilities of
all WDs for a given input. Although some WDs are not
confident with their outputs for some AEs, other WDs are
able to correctly classify some AEs with high confidence.
AVEP takes advantages of the expertise of the latter WDs
in order to find a label with the highest average confidence.
AVEP collects predicted probabilities of all WDs and then
take an average of the outputs; finally, AVEP returns the
predicted label with the highest probability value.
5) Average Logits (AVEL) is another strategy based on
average outputs of all WDs. Some information may get lost
through use of the sigmoid transformation in CNNs [24].
Therefore, AVEL utilizes the information hidden in the
logits to produce the output label with the highest average
logits; the calculation of the output is similar to AVEP.
C. Threat Models
In this work, we make the following assumptions:
• The attackers can attack only at the inference/testing phase.
• The attackers can modify only the input data; neither the
models nor the training data can be modified by attackers.
Depending on adversary’s knowledge of the ensemble (ar-
chitectures and hyper-parameters of WDs, ensemble strategies,
etc.), we considered four different threat models [4], [6]:
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• Zero-Knowledge is the weakest model, since the attacker
is not even aware that a defense is in place; however, here
we assume that the attacker knows the exact architecture
and parameters of the UM. It is important to verify using
this weak model, because failing this test implies that the
stronger tests under adaptive attackers will also fail [6].
• Black-box model assumes that the adversary has no knowl-
edge of the ensemble model, but it is aware of the fact that a
defense mechanism is protecting the classifier. The attacker
queries the ensemble model as a normal classifier, feeding
it with an input and getting the corresponding predicted
label. This is a plausible practical setting, since knowledge
about the parameters of the networks inside the ensemble
may be difficult for the adversary to obtain. Yet, previous
studies have shown that AEs transfer across classifiers [10],
[34], [41]; therefore, adversaries can use their own privately
trained models to create AEs for the target ML system
under attack. Here, we assume that the attacker knows the
architecture and hyper-parameters of UM; while it does not
know the exact parameters of the model and is not aware
of the whole training data, it does, however, have access to
a portion of training data albeit without the correct label.
• Grey-box model assumes that the adversary has full knowl-
edge of the architecture and parameters of UM and each
of the WDs as well as the list of transformations. In
spite of this known information, the attacker knows nothing
regarding the ensemble strategy.
• White-box is the strongest threat model, in which the adver-
sary has full knowledge of the ensemble model including:
– The architecture and hyper-parameters of UM f .
– The list of transformations {Ti|i = 1, 2, 3, . . . } and archi-
tecture and parameters of all WD {fti |i = 1, 2, 3, . . . }.
– The ensemble strategy.
D. Evaluation against Zero-Knowledge Static Attack
Here we generate AEs with individual state-of-the-art at-
tacks and verify whether the proposed ensemble defense can
overcome the attacks. We generated 27 sets of AEs (see
Figure 15 for samples) using 9 attacks (Section IV-A). We
then evaluated UM, WDs, and all ensemble models against
BS and each AE set.
Figure 4 presents the test accuracy of each of the 78 models
(1 UM, 72 WDs, and 5 ensembles) against the 27 AE sets.
We assign the same color for markers of the same category of
transformations. We made the following observations:
• Since robustness may be at odd with accuracy [42], we
evaluated all models over the clean examples (labeled with
“BS”). With the exception of the RD ensemble, which
achieved a test accuracy of 98.58%, all the defense ensem-
bles achieved a test accuracy greater than the UM, which
was 98.91%. Moreover, all WDs achieved test accuracy that
is comparable to the test accuracy of UM—all WDs had a
test accuracy above 98% except one, which was 96%.
• When under attack, the effectiveness of UM drops consid-
erably. For AEs generated by the same attack, the higher
the magnitude used, the more powerful the AEs become.
The test accuracy of UM decreases as magnitude of AEs
increases (from left to right per attack). For example, when
evaluating against FGSM, UM has a test accuracy of 74.69%
for  = 0.1, 28.45% for  = 0.2, and 11.15% for  = 0.3.
• The effectiveness of WDs varies depending on the AEs
generated by JSMA and ONE-PIXEL; however most WDs
can recover the true label. The performance of WDs varies
more under these two attacks; nevertheless, most of them
still have near perfect accuracy. When evaluated against a
JSMA attack, 4 WDs achieved test accuracy lower than
70% for θ = 0.15 (4 for θ = 0.18 and 3 for θ = 0.21).
When evaluated against ONE-PIXEL (pxCnt = 30), 3 WDs
achieved accuracy lower than 70%, and all WDs achieved
accuracy above 70% for the other two variants. Therefore,
for these attacks, we still have many effective WDs to build
highly effective ensembles.
• The effectiveness of WDs are very similar under the
BIM l2, BIM l∞, CW l2, MIM, and PGD attacks. Al-
most all transformations can recover AEs generated by these
attacks. Surprisingly, all transformations can recover the
strongest attacks in the literature, i.e., CW l2. More specif-
ically, when evaluated against the most powerful CW l2
AEs (i.e. when lr = 0.015), the test accuracy of UM
drops to 12.78%, but the least effective WD still achieves
a test accuracy of 92.83%. The performance of WDs varies
slightly under other attacks. For example, 4 WDs achieve
test accuracy lower than 70% for attack PGD ( : 0.1). As
most WDs are highly effective, with test accuracy above
90%, all ensembles are effective against these attacks.
• The spreads of the performance of WDs for FGSM and
DEEPFOOL vary the most. The effectiveness of transforma-
tions are more consistent for a DEEPFOOL attack; while in
contrast, the performance spread is wider for AEs generated
by FGSM. Despite that more WDs decrease in robustness,
as long as there are enough WDs that work correctly,
we can still build an effective ensemble. For example, for
FGSM ( : 0.2), 12 WDs achieve an accuracy lower than
70%. Accordingly, by utilizing (possible) useful information
in the WDs, we can still build ensembles that achieve an
accuracy above 90%. Evaluated with AEs generated by
FGSM ( : 0.3), 47 WDs have an accuracy lower than
50%, but ensembles can still achieve an accuracy above
75%. Tested on AEs generated by DEEPFOOL (overshoot:8),
28 WDs achieved an accuracy lower than 70%; however,
ensembles can achieve an accuracy higher than 80%. When
a certain amount of WDs—number varies per ensemble
strategy and attack—become ineffective, it is difficult to
construct an effective ensemble using such ineffective WDs.
For example, for DEEPFOOL (overshoot:20), 65 WDs have
an accuracy lower than 50% and although there are still
few WDs that achieved accuracy close to 60%, none of our
ensembles achieve an accuracy exceeding 50%. However,
the magnitude of perturbations in these AEs are high and
they are easily detectable by a naı¨ve detector (cf., Figure 10).
• Changes in effectiveness of WDs vary on the adversaries
that were used to generate AEs. AEs that are closer to the BS
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Fig. 4: Test accuracy of individual weak defenses and ensembles against various adversarial test data sets.
are likely recovered by a greater number of transformations.
For example, with small normalized l2 dissimilarities (cf.,
Figure 10), AEs that were generated by CW l2, BIM l2,
BIM l∞, MIM, and PGD attacks as well as AEs gener-
ated by FGSM, DEEPFOOL, and ONE-PIXEL with small
perturbed magnitudes are recovered by most WDs. As the
distance between AEs and BS increases, less WDs are able
to recover the AEs.
E. Evaluation against Black-box Attacks
Under the black-box threat model, the attackers’ knowledge
regarding the system is only based on information gained
by querying the target classifier. Thus attackers construct a
substitute model fsub, mimicking the original target model fens,
using only a limited training data4, they use the substitute
model to create AEs and to launch attacks on the system.
This strong assumption challenges the attacker in many ways
when crafting an AE, such as selecting a technique for building
the substitute model and preparing a sample set for label
collection given a limited query budget [19]. Although we
could consider different assumptions for the knowledge of
the attacker in black-box attacks, we instead considered the
strongest possible black-box attack to make our evaluation
even stronger, where the adversary knows the exact DNN
architecture, optimization strategy, and hyper-parameters of
the original target model. The attacker can then use the
substitute model’s parameters and perform a white-box attack
on the substitute model. Finally, we evaluate the accuracy of
the original model, meaning that we test whether these AEs
transfer to the original model. More specifically, as shown in
Figure 5, we evaluate the black-box threat model as follows:
1) Collect a data set of N samples, Dbb = {(x,y)|y =
fens(x),x ∈ D}, by querying the ensemble model N times.
2) Build a substitute model fsub, mimicking the original target
model fens, which is trained on the collected data set Dbb.
4It may be flagged suspicious if the attacker query the system many times.
3) Generate adversarial examples to attack the new target
model fsub.
4) Attack the ensemble fens using the AEs generated for the
substitute model fsub.
Train a substitue classifier
fsub
fens
Collect training data set
2
1
Craft adversarial examples 
for  the substitute classifier3
Dbb
x
x'
{ x|x in D}
Attack  the ensemble model4
Fig. 5: The evaluation process of a black-box threat model.
For each ensemble model we trained a substitute model,
each of which uses a set of random samples from a subset
of the MNIST test set and their corresponding labels that
have been collected from the target ensemble model. The
MNIST subset has 1k samples, and from this set, we created
4 sets containing 50, 100, 500, and 1k samples with uniform
distribution across classes (we created even more extreme
cases with a very low budget 10 or a higher budget 5k, and we
presented the results in Figure 20). The remaining 9k samples
in MNIST test set were used for the evaluation of the defense
in this threat model.
Once we trained the substitute model associated to each
budget, we used the parameters of the trained model to launch
attacks against the substitute model. For each substitute model,
we created AEs using the 9 adversarial attacks as listed in
Table II, and we used the generated AEs to attack the target
ensemble model. Therefore, for a target ensemble model, 36
sets of AEs (9 attack types each having 4 different budgets)
were created for evaluation. To limit the computational cost,
we used 1k samples out of 9k test samples for generating AEs.
We used the accuracy improvement of the target ensemble
model over a substitute model when they are under the same
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Fig. 6: Model accuracy when under attack in black-box. The red square on the FGSM
axis in the bottom-right radar chart indicates that the MV ensemble holds roughly 70%
accuracy under the attacking scenario where the attacker has a query budget of 1000.
attack to indicate the effectiveness of our proposed defense.
Here, we report the detailed results of targeting the RD
ensemble and the MV ensemble. The results of the other
ensembles we tested are similar, and, therefore, we provide
these additional results in the Appendix (see Figure 21).
Overall, for the RD ensemble, the accuracy improvement
falls within the range [20.12%, 92.83%] with a 57% average.
The accuracy of the RD ensemble is calculated over 100 runs.
The accuracy distribution of the 100 runs for each attack and
each budget are shown in Figures 22 and 23. For the other
four ensembles, the accuracy improvement falls in the range
[26.3%, 97.5%] with a 65.28% average. Based on results in
Figure 6, we make the following observations:
• Even though the generated attack was successful in under-
mining the substitute models, most generated AEs were not
able to transfer to the defense system; both the RD and MV
ensembles were able to sustain a relatively high accuracy
under the generated attacks.
– More specifically, when targeting both the RD and MV
ensembles, each type of AEs (except One-Pixel) was able
to effectively attack substitute models, thereby limiting
their accuracy below 35%. But the RD ensemble sustains
its test accuracy above 50% for 31 out of 36 AE sets and
above 70% for 20 out of 36 sets, while the MV ensemble
is able to maintain its accuracy above 50% for 33 out of
36 sets and 70% 28 out of 36 AE sets.
• The accuracy of the target ensemble decreases when the
query budget increases (except with JSMA). With a higher
budget, the attacker is able to build a more accurate surro-
gate model and, therefore, craft more effective AEs, which
could make the defense suffer from a lower accuracy.
The observations show that ATHENA could effectively fight
against the black-box adversaries. It is important to empha-
size that the results could have been even better for our
defense mechanism under under a weaker black-box threat
model, where the knowledge of DNN architecture and hyper-
Algorithm 1: Crafting an adversarial example in white-
box/gray-box threat model
input : x, y, attacker, N, max_dissimilarity
1 Ffooled ← EMPTY SET;
2 Fcand ← all weak defenses;
3 x′ ← x;
4 while size(Ffooled) < N do
5 ftarget ← pickTarget(Fcand, strategy) ;
6 perturbation← attacker.getPerturbation(x′) ;
7 x′tmp ← x′ + perturbation
8 if dissimilarity(x′tmp,x) > max_dissimilarity then
9 break;
10 end
11 for fti in Fcand do
12 if y 6= fti (x′tmp) then
13 addModel(Ffooled, fti ) ;
14 removeModel(Fcand, fti ) ;
15 end
16 end
17 x′ ← x′tmp;
18 end
19 return x′;
parameters is not known by the adversary, such that the
attacker confronts greater difficulty in crafting effective AEs.
F. Evaluation against Gray-box and White-box Attacks
Here we use a greedy approach to evaluate the effectiveness
of ATHENA under gray-box and white-box threat models. Us-
ing the procedure in Algorithm 1, we generated a set of AEs;
each of the AEs is able to fool (i) all weak defenses for a gray-
box model or (ii) a certain number, N, of weak defenses for
a white-box model within a specific distance (i.e., normalized
dissimilarity between perturbed and clean input as computed
by Formula 2). The value of N depends on the ensemble
strategy being used and the attack approach. For example, for
an ensemble model using a MV strategy, the attacker must
fool at least 90% of the WDs if they generate AEs using an
untargeted attack. The use of a maximum dissimilarity ensures
the sample is not being perturbed too much. The maximum
dissimilarity is also a factor that determines the efforts that
the attacker can afford for generating AEs.
Algorithm 1 presents the core procedure for crafting a
single AE x′ for a given clean input x by fooling at most
N WDs within a specific distance from the clean input x (i.e.,
max dissimilarity—the maximum normalized l2 dissimilarity
between x′ and x.). The set of WDs being fooled, Ffooled, by
the current perturbed sample x′tmp, is initially empty. The set
of WDs yet to be fooled, Fcand, is initially all the WDs used to
build the defense ensemble. The adversarial example, x′, starts
from x and is perturbed iteratively until at least N WDs have
been fooled or the dissimilarity between x′tmp and x is greater
than the constraint of max dissimilarity. At each iteration,
the target model can be selected via different strategies. For
example, the attacker can use (i) a random candidate WD, (ii)
the most effective candidate WD against the attack method, or
(iii) the least effective candidate WD against the attack method
as their target model to perturb in the current iteration. In
the algorithm, any attack method (e.g., FGSM, DEEPFOOL,
MIM, etc.) can be used to craft adversarial perturbations.
The function dissimilarity(x′,x) returns the normalized l2
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TABLE II: The attack methods used for crafting adversarial examples and their parameters under black-box threat model.
Attack Type BIM l2 BIM l∞ CW l2 DF l2 FGSM JSMA MIM One-Pixel PGD
Crafting Configuration  = 2  = 0.3 LearningRate = 1.0 Overshoot = 0  = 0.3 θ = 0.5, γ = 0.7  = 0.3 PixelCount = 30  = 0.3
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Fig. 7: Evaluation results for (a) Gray-box and (b) White-box threat models by detector,
MV ensemble, and a simple supreme model combining the detector and the MV ensemble
(cf., detection + MV ens): (i) percentage of detected adversarial examples by detector
(blue lines), (ii) test accuracy of the MV ensemble (green lines), and (iii) as compared
to the maximum normalized dissimilarity of AE sets.
dissimilarity (defined in Formula 2) between two samples
(i.e., N = 1), and the function getPerturbation(x) returns the
generated perturbation, i.e., ‖x− x′‖2.
Here are some specific settings we used for evaluation:
• We evaluate an ensemble built on 72 WDs using only the
MV ensemble strategy.
• In order to add perturbations related to a variety of transfor-
mations into a single AE within a reasonable computational
time, we use FGSM( = 0.1). Using smaller  means it
will take much longer to generate an AE that is able to fool
just one WD. In our experiments, by adding perturbations
iteratively that are guaranteed to fool one WD, it takes 2 to
4 iterations on average to craft a single AE.
• In a gray-box model, with no knowledge of the ensemble
strategy, the attacker aims to generate AEs that are able to
fool all WDs (i.e., 72 WDs), such that the AEs are likely
to fail any strategy, as none of the WDs work correctly. In
a white-box model, however, the attacker knows that the
MV strategy is used and wants to perform an untargeted
attack; therefore, the attacker needs to fool at least 90%
(72 × 90% = 65) of the WDs to ensure the MV ensemble
cannot recover the correct label.
• To generate AEs with similar adversarial strength to
FGSM AEs based on UM (see Figure 10), we set the
distance constraint—max dissimilarity—for the 10 AE sets
from 0.1 to 1.0 with an interval of 0.1.
• We randomly pick a target model from Fcand.
Based on the results in Figure 7 (as well as Figures 17 and
18), we make the following observations:
• With modest effort, the attacker is able to generate less
costly AEs. It takes on average less than 35 seconds to gen-
erate a single AE for white-box model (Figure 17) and less
than 50 seconds for gray-box model (Figure 18). However,
such AEs are not strong enough to fool the MV ensemble.
As presented in Figure 7, the MV ensemble achieves a test
accuracy exceeding 90% and is robust against such AEs,
which are too weak to fool many WDs. For example, on
average, each AE with max dissimilarity = 0.1 cannot even
fool a single WD, even with max dissimilarity = 0.4; where
as each AE on average can only fool 10% (7/72) of WDs,
although 90% of WDs can recover the correct labels.
• On the other spectrum, as the constraint of
max dissimilarity relaxes, the attacker is able to generate
stronger AEs. The test accuracy of MV ensemble drops
from 99.44% (Figure 4) to 16% against gray-box and
6% against white-box attack. The MV ensemble model
is ineffective as (i) most of the WDs are fooled by the
AEs and (ii) AEs are very dissimilar to BS. As presented
in Figures 17 and 18, on average, a single AE is able to
fool 63.43 out of 72 (i.e., 88.09%) WDs for gray-box
and 62.74 (i.e., 87.14%) WDs for white-box. Detailed
information about the distribution of these statistics can
be found in Figures 17 and 18. When most of the WDs
produce incorrect outputs, our ensemble model is likely to
be fooled. However, this comes at a price:
– High cost: Although attackers are able to generate AEs
that fool the ensemble, it is extremely expensive for them
to achieve this goal. For example, in order to craft a single
AE, it takes 747.77 seconds for the gray-box threat model
and 610.35 seconds for the white-box threat model.
– Easily detectable: Furthermore, although such AEs suc-
cessfully fool the MV ensemble, they are perturbed heav-
ily5 and very likely to be detected either by a human
(see Figure 16) or a detector. We used an existing detec-
tor [15] to test our hypothesis regarding the possibility
of detecting such AEs with high confidence. As shown
in Figure 7, the detector is able to successfully detect
87.76% of AEs for the gray-box and 89.8% of AEs for
the white-box. An enhanced version of our framework
with the detector (Detection + MV ensemble) can achieve
a high accuracy on AEs with any attacking strength by
either detecting and/or recovering the correct label via
WDs. The combination of detector and MV ensemble
achieves a test accuracy above 90% for all AEs (except
when max dissimilarity = 0.7) for both threat models.
V. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As shown in our extensive evaluations, ATHENA is effective
against a wide variety of adversaries from the weakest threat
model (zero-knowledge) to the strongest one (white-box). Here
we investigate why and how a transformation is able to block
an adversary? Does one or a set of transformations exist
that are generally effective against any adversary? Does the
effectiveness of an ensemble rely on the number and diversity
5The average normalized dissimilarity of AEs (0.9883 for gray-box and
0.8511 for white-box) is larger than that of the strongest FGSM (0.8364).
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of WDs? What are the costs of our ensemble defense? In
particular, we wish to address the following research questions:
1) RQ1: Can transformations work as a weak defense?
a) How does a transformation or composition block the
effectiveness of an adversarial perturbation?
b) Does the robustness of a weak defense depend on the
type of adversarial attack?
2) RQ2: Can we construct an effective ensemble using many
diverse weak defenses?
a) Will an ensemble’s effectiveness rely on the number of
weak defenses?
b) Will ensemble’s effectiveness rely on the ensemble
strategy it uses?
3) RQ3: What is the overhead of our proposed framework?
VI. RQ 1. EFFECTIVENESS OF WDS
A. How Does a Transformation Block the Effectiveness of an
Adversarial Perturbation?
1) Study Design: AEs are meaningful, yet imperceptible
perturbed features of the data distribution that induce the
classifier to make erroneous predictions [25]; in order to
understand how a transformation augments the features such
that it helps to recover the “distorted” features for the classifier
to make the correct prediction decision, we used t-SNE [43].
t-SNE is a technique that uses joint probability distributions
to describe the closeness of data points and to visualize the
classification results of a data set. In our experiment, the data
set D contains 50 AEs (generated with the same attack), which
originated from 50 BS of a target class (e.g., class 9) as well
as 250 BS from the target class. In addition, D further contains
300 BS for each of the other classes. We investigated the
impact of our framework on 9 types of AEs and in 10 classes
in MNIST. For each type of AE, we first ranked the 72 WDs
in terms of classification accuracy on the same type of AEs
crafted from the MNIST testing set (i.e., 10k samples), and
then picked three WDs—one from the top three, one from
the medium three, and one from the the bottom three. The
representation of a sample fed into t-SNE is the probability
prediction of the sample by either the UM or a WD.
2) Results: Here, we report only the result of investigating
the impact of three WDs on the CW l2 AEs, originated from
the BS of class 9. The three WDs are the ones associated with
transformations, filter minimum (bottom performer), noise
speckle (medium performer) and flip both (top performer). Fig-
ure 8 (a) illustrates the classification result by the undefended
model, while the other three sub-plots show the classification
results by the corresponding WDs. Overall, we emphasize the
following observations from our results:
• WDs bring AEs back to the mass of BS whose labels are the
same as these AEs’ original labels. Comparing Figure 8 (a)
with Figure 8 (b), (c), or (d), it can be observed that the
majority of the AEs are classified as class 9 (square 9),
which they have successfully recovered.
• A set of WDs could complement each other. The top
performer, WD (flip both), still misclassifies some AEs into
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Fig. 8: The impact of 3 WDs on CW l2 AEs originated from class 9. AEs are
represented in hollow squares while BS are represented solid circles.
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Fig. 9: Rank correlation between the accuracy of WDs in different AEs.
class 3, while the bottom performer, WD (filter minimum),
could successfully recover these misclassified AEs back to
the original class 9. A similar case can be observed by
comparing WDs (noise speckle and flip both).
These two interesting findings are also confirmed in the
result of other AE types (see Figure 24 in the Appendix).
Summary. Transformations are able to block an adversarial
perturbation by recovering the “distorted” features, such that
the AE could fall closer to the group of BSs bearing its
original label.
B. Why Diversity of WDs Matters?
1) Study Design: To answer this question, we investigate
whether WDs perform similarly in two different adversarial
attack scenarios. In more specific terms, we calculate the
rank correlation between a list of the respective performances
of WDs in the context of different adversarial attacks. A
positive rank correlation indicates that the listed WDs perform
similarly, while a negative rank correlation indicates that the
they behaved differently, and a small value of rank correlation
means that the effectiveness of the listed WDs has little
relation between the two types of attacks. We conducted
the experiment with 72 WDs and 27 sets of AEs that were
10
0.
27
88 0
.
42
31
0.
83
64
0.
08
02
0.
14
05
0.
30
11
0.
58
75
0.
10
30
0.
12
16
0.
08
37
0.
11
16
0.
13
39
0.
15
71
0.
18
6
0.
24
16
0.
27
79
0.
29
81
0.
30
52
0.
18
23 0.
26
6 0.
35
53
0.
11
24
0.
16
48 0.
21
42
0.
16
12
0.
19
11
0.
21
08
FGSM BIM_l2 BIM_l? DeepFool CW_l2 JSMA One-Pixel MIM PGD
overshoot learning rate ? px count
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.75 1.0 1.2 0.075 0.09 0.12 3 8 20 0.01 0.012 0.015 0.15 0.18 0.21 5 15 30 0.05 0.075 0.1 0.075 0.09 0.1
Fig. 10: Normalized l2 dissimilarity between BS and each AE type.
generated in a zero-knowledge threat model. We computed the
Spearman’s rank correlation between classification accuracy of
the 72 WDs for each pair of different AE sets.
2) Results: The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
are plotted in Figure 9, where the size of a square is determined
based on the absolute value of the correlation coefficient. For
two sets of AEs within the same group of attack (except for the
pair, FGSM ( = 0.1) and FGSM ( = 0.3)), the correlation
of the WDs’ performances tends to be strong, which could
be observed from the nine 3 × 3 sub-matrices along the
diagonal in Figure 9. In the exceptional pair, the difference
between the two sets of AEs is the perturbation level—a
fair amount of this difference could result in a significant
difference in dissimilarity when compared with the BS. As
seen in Figure 10, the dissimilarity of FGSM ( = 0.3) is 2.5x
higher than that of FGSM ( = 0.1). Combining Figures 9
and 10, it also could be observed that if their dissimilarity
values are close, this set of WDs perform similarly (high
correlation) between two different sets of AEs under the same
attack group, e.g., the group of BIM l2 AEs. Therefore, we
believe that the dissimilarity of AEs plays an important role.
But is the dissimilarity the only factor that impacts the
performance similarity of WDs? The answer is no. As
seen in Figure 9, the difference of dissimilarity values be-
tween BIM l2 ( = 0.75) and BIM l2 ( = 1.0) is
larger than the difference between BIM l2 ( = 0.75)
and CW l2 (learning rate = 0.01), while the perfor-
mance of the WDs in BIM l2 ( = 0.75) is much
more related to BIM l2 ( = 1.0) compared to that of
CW l2 (learning rate = 0.01). This indicates that the intrin-
sic similarity of two sets of AEs (which resulted from different
types of adversarial attacks) is a critical factor and indeed
more important than the dissimilarity value. This conclusion
is affirmed in Figure 9 by the strong correlations between the
performances of WDs in the listed AE types, FGSM ( = 0.1),
BIM l∞, MIM, and PGD. As a matter of fact, FGSM is a
simplified version of BIM l∞, MIM, and PGD, and they each
belong to the same family of gradient-based attacks. Another
important observation is that, for AE sets belong to different
attack groups, the WDs tend to behave differently (namely,
either low or negative correlation.)
The observations above drive us to reach the conclusion
that it could be sufficient to select a small group of WDs
when defending against a group of AEs that come from the
same kind of attacks and have close dissimilarity values since
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Fig. 11: Test accuracy ensembles built with various numbers of WDs.
the selected WDs could defend against each type of AEs with
a similar level of perturbation. However, such a defense type
will be ineffective in practice, because we usually have no
knowledge of the incoming AEs, let alone do we operate from
the strict assumption, made by this defense as to the type and
dissimilarity values of incoming AEs.
Summary. A diverse set of weak defenses is indeed neces-
sary to build a robust defense against adversarial attacks.
VII. RQ 2. EFFECTIVENESS OF ENSEMBLES
A. Does the Effectiveness of an Ensemble Defense Rely on the
Number of WDs?
1) Study Design: To address this question, we start with
one random WD and then build a new ensemble by adding a
new random WD into the current ensemble. We repeated this
step until all 72 WDs had been used for building the ensemble.
After the results of all 72 ensembles had been collected, we
evaluated them with the 27 AE sets that were generated in
a zero-knowledge threat model. We performed this process 5
times and computed the average accuracy.
2) Results: Figure 11 (refer to Figure 14 for the complete
results) presents the average accuracy against 9 sets of AE
(the strongest among each adversary). We observed that—
1) In general, with the exception of the RD strategy, the larger
amount of WDs, the more robust the ensemble became
against all attacks.
2) For the RD strategy, building the ensemble with a greater
number of WDs did not improve its robustness when
considering that its expected effectiveness is the average
effectiveness of all WDs. However, this ensemble strategy
has the benefit of randomness, which makes it difficult for
the attacker to identify what selection of WDs will be used
at test time.
3) The effectiveness of T2MV converges much slower than
other strategies which result is even more pronounced
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especially when most WDs are effective. One reason for
this result is that the T2MV strategy requires more WDs
as a conduction for providing enough correct information
to overcome the distraction from noise. BS, for example,
requires at least 30 WDs in order for the T2MV ensemble
to achieve a test accuracy comparable to ensembles using
other strategies. When using other strategies, the defense
ensemble only requires less than 5 WDs to converge.
4) When all ensemble strategies were evaluated with AEs
generated by DEEPFOOL(os:20), the effectiveness of en-
sembles first increases when we add more WDs. At a
certain point though, if we keep adding new WDs, its
effectiveness starts decreasing, and it further converges at a
lower test accuracy. As observed in the column labeled as
“DEEPFOOL(os:20)” in Figure 4, the effectiveness of most
WDs drop significantly compared to other adversaries—
65.28% achieve a test accuracy lower than 40%.
Summary. Subject to the exception of ensembles that use
the RD strategy, in general, the greater number of WDs being
employed in a defense ensemble, the more robust it will be.
B. Is There Any Ensemble Strategy that Always Outperforms
Other Ensembles?
1) Study Design: In order to address questions regarding
an ensemble’s effectiveness and ensemble strategies, we built
ensembles of various sizes for each ensemble strategy and then
evaluated the ensembles against BS as well as 27 sets of AEs
(in the same manner as was done for research question VII-A).
2) Results: As presented in Figure 4 and Figure 11, we
make the following observations:
• No single strategy is always the most effective against
all attacks. But for most cases, the RD strategy is the
least effective strategy after the performance of all defenses
converge.
• The specialized knowledge of individual WDs and their
respective logits values can help improve the robustness of
ensembles in the context of AEs that are heavily perturbed.
However, these types of information become noise when the
ensemble is evaluated with AEs that are less perturbed. For
example, when evaluated with the top 2 dissimilar AE sets—
FGSM( : 0.3) (0.8364) and DEEPFOOL(os:20) (0.5875)—
AVEP and AVEL are much more effective than other
strategies. In contrast, when evaluated with CW(lr:0.015),
MV and T2MV strategies are more effective than AVEP and
AVEL for the AE set that is closest to BS (0.1216).
Summary. No single ensemble strategy is the most robust
against all adversaries. However, AVEL, with the addition
of increased specialized information, works well in all cases
and achieves either the highest accuracy or an accuracy
comparable to the other evaluated strategies.
VIII. RQ 3. OVERHEAD OF ENSEMBLE
1) Study Design: Here, we specifically look into two types
of overhead: memory overhead and online time overhead. The
main cause of memory overhead results from loading the
(b) Inferences and ensemble strategies(a) Transformations
Fig. 12: Overhead of transformations, inference, and ensemble evaluation in ATHENA.
neural network model associated to each WD. It is clear that
memory consumption will be roughly N times of that used by
the UM if N WDs are adopted. For online time overhead, the
UM just requires the cost of inference, while ATHENA consist
of transformations, inference calculations for each WD, and
final calculations for determining the output label.
We evaluated, in a GCP machine (see Table IV), the online
time overhead of the 5 ensembles, which are based on a set of
72 WDs and 9 types of AEs by comparing the inference time
of the UM with the time costs of the three aforementioned
components.
2) Results: As seen in Figure 12 (b), the time cost of each
of the 5 ensembles is trivial when compared to the inference
time of the UM. For instance, the inference time of the UM
is around 10 times of the time cost of the majority-voting
based ensemble. Because the set of selected WDs could be
deployed in parallel, the online time overhead in the set of
WDs is dominated by the slowest WD insofar, as it consumes
the largest amount of time for transformation and inference.
Figure 12 (b) also illustrates that the inference time of the
transformation model in each WD is larger than the inference
time of the UM but at the same magnitude level. For example,
the largest inference time of the transformation model for
FGSM( : 0.3) is about 1.6x the inference time of the UM.
Since the time cost of inference time in WDs and ensemble
strategy is on par with the inference time of the UM, the
online time overhead will be impacted most by the slowest
transformation. As seen in Figure 12 (a), a large and diverse set
of 50 out of the 72 WDs is available for ensemble design with
a time cost similar to the inference time of the UM. Another
key point is that the design set of WDs can be adjusted to
trade off the ensemble performance with online time overhead,
which tradeoff may be necessary for time-critical applications.
Summary. The memory overhead ATHENA is high and is
proportional to the number of WDs used in the ensemble;
however, the inference time in the framework is on par with
the inference time of the original undefended model.
IX. DISCUSSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Even though our defense increases model robustness, the
following several areas are known as areas for improvement:
• Flexible defense framework: While our defense causes a sig-
nificant increase in model accuracy in a variety of settings,
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there are cases where the accuracy of the model is still low.
In such cases, it is likely that our defense would have to be
combined with other defenses, such as adversarial detection
methods, in order to create a ML system that is secure
against evasion attacks. ATHENA is a generic framework that
can be used in conjunction with a variety of ML classifiers,
and it will not interfere with the operation of other defense
mechanisms given its well-defined input-output. Since our
defense increases the amount of perturbation needed to
achieve a certain level of accuracy, it may even further serve
as an aid for detection based defenses.
• Extensible defense framework: We constructed and evaluated
an instance of ATHENA with only 72 WDs; however, the
framework can be expanded with more (or fewer) types of
transformations depending on the strength of the defense
one may desire and the overhead that one can handle. We
envision a generative process of composing transformations.
For example, we can compose two filters as WDs to generate
the third one: Tg = T1 ◦ T2. In Figure 19, we present
the evaluation results of a simple extension using a WD
associated to a composition of three filters. We can see
that using a more complex transformation (i.e., compos-
ite transformation of several simple transformations) may
improve the model’s robustness. Then again, there is no
guarantee that the composition would result in a stronger
WD in general. We can even formulate the whole process
of constructing the ensemble of WDs as a multi-objective
optimization problem, where the aim is to automatically
search for an optimal and diverse WDs with low overhead
using a search method rather than manually as we did here.
• Diverse application domains: Since we decided to evaluate
the performance of our framework and empirically under-
stand why such a defense works, empirically in depth, we
decided to perform all experiments on MNIST data set. Even
though we have some evidence that the observations still
hold in larger data sets such as CIFAR10 and ImageNet, we
plan to perform such evaluation, in depth, as a future work.
We will consider different model architectures, classifiers
not necessarily restricted to DNNs, while also considering
different domains (medical imaging and voice), and possibly
more variety of attacks targeting transformations, e.g., [1].
• Model robustness via automated testing: Investigating how
ATHENA may enable automated testing of machine learning
systems is considered as a fruitful future direction [36].
We plan to explore these directions in future work.
X. RELATED WORK
There has been extensive research on developing defenses
against adversarial attacks; however, they have mainly focused
on specific model families or application domains. In addition,
the current defenses provide improved robustness against only
known attacks, where the adversary possesses no or limited
knowledge about the details of the defense, such that it is
unclear if these defense mechanisms will be effective against
adversaries with complete knowledge of their existences.
The robustness of machine learning systems depends not
only on the model and the dominant supervised learning
paradigm [25], but also on the characteristics of data, such
as the dimensionality of the input data [14]. As a result,
existing defenses against adversarial attacks are either model-
specific or model-agnostic. Several defenses exist that increase
the robustness of models through the supervised training
process. For example, several forms of adversarial training
based on combining normal and adversarial examples in the
training [41] or using an adversarial objective as a regular-
izer [8], [17], [26], [37] have been proposed. Model-agnostic
approaches either detect adversarial examples before feeding
them to classifiers [18], [31]; attempt to remove adversarial
perturbations from the input [2], [9], [12], [20], [28] or fea-
tures [44], [46]; or combining both detection and removal [30].
Model-specific defenses make strong assumptions (e.g.,
about the norm they use for creating adversarial examples)
about the type and nature of the adversary; therefore, the
adversary can alter its attack to circumvent such model-specific
defenses. Model-agnostic defenses have also been shown in-
sufficient for removing adversarial perturbations from input
data [7]. Even small ensembles of model-agnostic defenses
have been shown to be brittle even against non-adaptive
adversaries [22]. In this work, we provide for the first time,
that ensembles of many and diverse sets of weak defenses
are indeed effective to block adversarial attacks. The proposed
framework has the capability to unify and incorporate existing
and even future weak defenses into the ensemble model and
make the defense mechanism even stronger.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and empirically investigated the ensemble of
many diverse weak defenses as a defense against evasion
attacks. We evaluated the proposed defense against state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks under zero-knowledge, black-box,
gray-box and white-box threat models and found out that our
defense makes the target model more robust against evasion
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, even though there has
been previous work on using transformation as a defense,
our empirical study is the first contribution that provides an
understanding of using many diverse transformations to make
machine learning systems more robust against evasion attacks
and has some viable potential properties: (1) applicability
across multiple machine learning models, (2) applicability in
different domains (image, voice, video), and (3) agnosticism to
particular attacks. Further, the tunability of our defense allows
a system designer to pick a suitable number and type of WDs
as well as a proper ensemble strategy that accounts for the
appropriate utility-security trade-off based on the application.
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Fig. 13: Test accuracy of ensembles increase as the number of weak defenses being used
to construct an ensemble increases. Such pattern exists in all types of attacks.
TABLE III: Transformation operations
Category Description
Rotation Rotate an input by a certain angle: rotate 90◦, 180◦, and 270◦.
Flip Flip an input horizontally and/or vertically.
Shift Shift an input in a direction by some pixels: shift left, right, up,
down, top-left, top-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right.
Cartoonify Cartoonify apples a sequence of image process operations on
the input, including bilateral filter, gray scaling, median blur,
create edge mask, and add the mask to original input.
Affine Transform an input by mapping variables (e.g., pixel intensity
values at position (x1, y1)) into new variables (e.g., (x2, y2))
by applying a linear combination of shift, rotation,
scaling and/or shearing operations: compress vertically
and/or horizontally, stretch vertically and/or horizontally.
Denoise Noise is generally considered to be a random variable with zero
mean. Denoise transformations average out noises from inputs:
nl means fast, nl means, tv menas, tv chambolle, and wavelet.
Morphology Morphological transformations apply operations based on
image shape: erosion, dilation, opening, closing, and gradient.
Noise Add noises to an input:
gaussian, localvar, pepper, poison, salt, and salt&peper.
Augmentation Real-time data augmentation:
feature-wise std normalization and sample-wise std normalization.
Segmentation Segmentation divides the image into groups of pixels based on
specific criteria. We segment an input based on colors.
Quantization Quantization reduces the number of colors in an input using
k-mean technique: 4 clusters and 8 clusters.
Distortion Distortion deforms the pixel grid in an input and maps the deformed
grid to the destination image: distort by x-axis or y-axis.
Filter Filter transformations smooth an input using various filter kernels:
entropy, gaussian, maximum, median, minimum, prewitt, rank,
scharr, roberts, sobel.
Compress Save images in different image formats: jpeg
(quality: 80%, 50%, 30%, and 10%), png(compression: 1, 5, and 8).
Geometric Apply different geometric transformations to images: iradon,
iradon sart, and swirl
TABLE IV: Hardware configurations for our experiments.
Experiment Platform
Training WDs PC 12 Intel(R) Core(TM)i7-8700 CPU @ 3.20GHz, 32 GB memory
Crafting AEs Google Cloud VM:
zero-knowledge & 8 Intel(R)Xeon(R) CPU @ 2.20GHz, 30 GB memory, 1 x NVIDIA Tesla P100
black-box 16 Intel(R)Xeon(R) CPU @ 2.30GHz, 14.4 GB memory
gray-box & white-box PC 12 Intel(R) Core(TM)i7-8700 CPU @ 3.20GHz, 32 GB memory
Examining overheads Google Cloud VM:
16 Intel(R)Xeon(R) CPU @ 2.30GHz, 14.4 GB memory
TABLE V: Test accuracies of substitute models.
Query Budget 10 50 100 500 1,000 5,000
RD Ensemble 40.09% 78.63% 83.20% 94.24% 95.91% 98.06%
MV Ensemble 39.43% 76.84% 85.28% 94.47% 95.62% 98.24%
T2MV Ensemble 36.51% 76.11% 83.77% 93.48% 95.40% 98.44%
AVEP Ensemble 40.39% 73.38% 82.96% 94.13% 95.59% 98.12%
AVEL Ensemble 39.36% 77.22% 83.80% 94.11% 95.52% 98.42%
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Fig. 14: Test accuracy ensembles built with various numbers of weak defenses.
Fig. 15: Sample adversarial examples generated by various adversaries.
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Fig. 16: Sample adversarial examples generated in gray-box and white-box threat models
with max_dissimilarity of 0.1–1.0.
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Fig. 17: Cost evaluation of AEs generated based on white-box model (MV strategy).
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Fig. 18: Cost evaluation of AEs generated based on gray-box model (MV strategy).
16
BS FGSM BIM_l2 BIM_l? DeepFool CW_l2 JSMA One-Pixel MIM PGD
overshoot learning rate px count
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.75 1.0 1.2 0.075 0.09 0.12 3 8 20 0.01 0.012 0.015 0.15 0.18 0.21 5 15 30 0.05 0.075 0.1 0.075 0.09 0.1
1.0
0.75
0.5
0.25
0.0
A
c
c
u
ra
c
y
UM
composition
noise
(gaussian)
affine_trans
(h&v compr)
filter
(minimum)
Fig. 19: Test accuracy of transformation composition of 3 filters.
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Fig. 20: Accuracy of surrogate model and target ensemble when under attack. The
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Fig. 21: Model accuracy when under attack in black-box threat model.
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Fig. 22: The distribution of RD ensemble’s accuracy over 100 runs per attack.
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Fig. 23: The distribution of RD ensemble’s accuracy over 100 runs per budget.
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Fig. 24: The impact of weak defenses on 8 types AEs originated from class 9. AEs are represented in hollow squares while benign samples are represented solid circles.
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